THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

MEETING WITH PRC LIAISON OFFICE CHIEF HUANG CHEN

Friday, July 6, 1973

DOS Review Completed.

The Western White House

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

To give you an opportunity to brief PRC Liaison Office Chief Huang Chen in the wake of your meetings with Soviet Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS PLAN

- A. <u>Background</u>. Ambassador Huang has accepted our invitation for a visit to San Clemente. This is his first trip in the United States outside of the Washington area.
- B. Participants. PRC Liaison Office Chief Huang Chen, Chi Ch'ao-chu (interpreter), Mr. Kissinger
- C. Press Plan. Meeting to be announced; photo opportunity.

III. TALKING POINTS

Welcoming Remarks

- It is a pleasure to welcome you to the Western White House. I appreciate your traveling this distance and I hope your flight has given you an opportunity to see something of our country.
- I am pleased that your wife has accompanied you here.

 Mrs. Nixon is happy to have the opportunity to meet with her,
 and to express her thanks for the warm reception she received
 when we were in China.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

Importance of Sino-U.S. Relations

- Our common dangers and our common interests have drawn our two nations together at a critical time in history.
- A strong and independent China, and good relations between China and the U.S. are in our own self-interest. We are very pleased with the progress our two nations have made in the development of our relations and we intend to insure that this progress continues.
- It is a cornerstone of our policy to see that Chinese strength and independence are maintained. Dr. Kissinger will discuss this specifically with you.

Cambodia

- It will be important to reiterate to Huang the points you and I have made to them regarding a Cambodian settlement. Briefly:
 - -- We agreed with the objective Prime Minister Chou En-lai stated to Ambassador Bruce: a neutral, independent and free Cambodia.
 - -- Reaching a settlement in Cambodia is a matter of greatest importance. It is key to the resolution of remaining issues in Indochina. It will have a very positive impact on Sino-U.S. relations.
 - -- The U.S. is not committed to any one man in Cambodia. We seek a settlement that will permit the warring elements to live together; over time the Cambodian people can determine for themselves what would be best for their future.
 - -- As we have stated, we are prepared to stop our bombing, withdraw our advisory group, arrange for Lon Nol to leave for medical treatment in the U.S., in return for a ceasefire of 60-90 days duration, and negotiations between the Sihanouk group and the remainder of the Lon Nol group.
 - -- We are also prepared, if a ceasefire is arranged, to have talks between the staff of Ambassador Bruce and the staff of Prince Sihanouk.

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-- Further, Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to meet with Prince Sihanouk for political discussions during his visit to Peking if a ceasefire is in effect by that time.

Chou En-lai Visit

- We would be happy to have Prime Minister Chou En-lai visit the United States.
- The visit would serve the interests of both our countries, and demonstrate in concrete terms the improved relationship between us.
- The form such a visit might take would be adjusted to your wishes.

U.S. - Soviet Relations

- You and your government are familiar with the negotiations that finally culminated in the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War we signed on June 22.
- When Dr. Kissinger described our objectives last February to your Prime Minister he said that we would undertake no obligation:
 - -- restricting the use of nuclear weapons;
 - -- involving third countries' relations with other third countries.
- We have lived up to that promise.
 - I have made the following written statements to your Prime Minister:
 - -- The agreement confers no special rights on either the U.S. or the USSR. Further, we would oppose any such claim.
 - -- The U.S. will oppose a policy that aims at hegemony or seeks to bring about the isolation of the People's Republic.
 - -- Any consultation under Article 4 of the agreement will be fully discussed with the Chinese Government before it is initiated and will not be concluded before the Chinese Government has an opportunity to express its view.

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- -- In no case will the U.S. participate in a joint move together with the Soviet Union under this agreement with respect to conflicts or disputes where the People's Republic of China is a party.
- What we have sought, and achieved, with this agreement is to inhibit Soviet behavior which would be contrary to our -- and your -- interests.
- Thus, there is no way the Soviets can resort to force without violating the agreement, thereby creating a legal basis for resistance. This is something we did not possess with respect to third countries prior to the signing of the agreement.
- As you know, I have written Chairman Brezhnev detailing our view of the agreement. I told him that:
 - -- We have not agreed to ban the use of any particular weapons.
 - -- The obligations we have accepted as applicable to conduct between the U.S. and the USSR are also applicable to our conduct toward others.
 - -- We have made commitments to each other but we have not agreed to impose any particular obligation or solution on others.
 - -- We have left the rights of the U.S. and the USSR, and the obligations each of us has undertaken, unimpaired.
- The U.S. will never participate in maneuvers aimed at isolating the People's Republic. We will never make an agreement that will be used to bring pressure on the People's Republic.
- Dr. Kissinger will be prepared publicly to state our opposition to hegemony and our readiness for full consultations with the PRC during his August visit to Peking.